Studies measuring barriers to firm growth assume economies are closed, ignoring information on firm exports. We argue that this information is key to interpreting data and improving the accuracy of model predictions. To do this, we develop a dynamic model with export and domestic barriers. We show theoretically that the closed economy model underestimates barriers and amplifies counterfactuals. By calibrating the model to a set of European countries, we find that the quantitative difference is significant: for example, the closed economy model fails to see that Italian firms are very efficient exporters but poor innovators, and instead concludes that they are mediocre innovators. In terms of predictions, the closed economy model delivers an elasticity of welfare to innovation costs between 31 and 64 percent larger than the open economy model. Keywords: firm dynamics, innovation and trade, pareto size distribution of firms JEL classification: F1, L11, O3 DOI: 10.1515/bejm-2018-0003
Introduction
A major concern in macroeconomics is how different institutions affect firm growth. One way to identify their effects is to focus on the size distribution of firms: in models with endogenous firm sizes, the relevant barriers to growth can be extracted by matching the model's distribution with its empirical counterpart. 1 Typically, however, these studies assume the economy is closed. Taking a different approach, we claim that information on exports adds an important dimension to the discussion beyond what firm size tells us, and this dimension should not be overlooked. In particular, this information helps in interpreting the data and improving policy recommendations.
First, adding an export decision allows us to distinguish between domestic and foreign barriers. The interaction between these determines the direct effect of a given policy (for example, when domestic barriers increase, firms shift their focus towards exports, reducing the aggregate consequences of the increase). Second, the existence of the export market changes the behavior of firms even if they do not export, as the possibility of exporting in the future could affect today's growth decisions. Thus, trade barriers affect both exporters and non-exporters. Although these channels and implications seem intuitive, our contribution is to present a clear characterization of the mechanisms and show their quantitative relevance.
Our model is a continuous time version of Melitz (2003) with endogenous productivities. Firms innovate to increase their productivities (and hence their size), as in Atkeson and Burstein (2010) . They become exporters by incurring a sunk cost and die at a constant rate. Firms are born as non-exporters, grow by innovating, and export after reaching a productivity threshold. The size of the market determines the gains from innovating: the larger the market size, the larger the gain and the greater the innovation. Thus, the model generates a positive relationship between size and productivity. Since higher trade costs prevent access to additional markets, they reduce the incentives to innovate. As a result, because firm productivity and firm size are directly related, a country may have, on average, smaller (less productive) firms because of high innovation costs, high trade costs, or both.
Exporters grow at a constant rate. Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Luttmer (2007 Luttmer ( , 2010 find similar results in the closed economy, in the sense that large firms grow at a constant rate. As in Gabaix (2011) , this implies that the upper tail of the size distribution of firms follows a Pareto distribution. Non-exporters grow at a rate that is increasing in firm size and equals the growth rate of exporters at the export threshold. Intuitively, the closer non-exporters are to becoming exporters, the higher the probability they will succeed in doing so, and the greater the returns to innovation.
Our choice of continuous time provides a great deal of additional tractability, relative to alternative frameworks such as Atkeson and Burstein (2010) Costantini and Melitz (2008) , or Rubini (2014) . We show analytically Loris Rubini is the corresponding author. ©2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) : firms take the demand functions for their products as given, and consumers take the supply functions of foreign goods as given. The supply functions from the rest of the world to each country are the same. The demand functions depend on income and price. All countries face a rest of the world with the same income.
Preferences. An infinitively lived representative consumer in country j has preferences ( ( , )) = ∫ ∞ 0 − ln ( ) , where 
where ω is the name of the good, Ω ( ), Ω * ( ) are the sets of goods produced in country j and the rest of the world at time t and ( ), * ( ) denote consumption of domestic and imported goods respectively. σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods. ρ > 0 is the discount factor.
Technologies. There are incumbent firms in each period that make production, innovation, and exporting decisions. Firms die instantly with an exogenous probability δ ∈ (0, 1). They are owned by domestic consumers, who receive lump-sum profits. Each firm is a monopolist. Given a productivity level z and labor services n, the firm producing good ω has technology: 5 ( ; ) = ( )
A firm can innovate to increase its productivity level z. We choose a functional form for the innovation cost that guarantees that in equilibrium Gibrat's law emerges for exporters (large firms in equilibrium). That is, in equilibrium, the exporter growth rate is independent of firm size. Increasing productivity by ż costs, in labor units,
where κ Ij is our measure of the innovation cost in country j. Exporting requires a one-time sunk cost of units of labor. 6 Once a firm becomes an exporter, it remains so until it dies. Exports are subject to iceberg trade costs. To deliver quantity q an exporter in country j must ship (1 + ) , ≥ 0. New firms can enter anytime with z = 1 by incurring an entry cost equal to κ e units of labor that does not vary across countries.
Labor Market Clearing.
= ∫ Ω ( ) [ ( , ) + ( ( , ),( , )) + ℐ ( , )] + ( )
where M j (t) is the measure of entrants in country j at time t, L j is the total number of workers, ( ( , ),( , )) is the labor demand for innovation of firm ω, at time t, and ℐ is the indicator function, which equals 1 if a firm producing good ω becomes an exporter in t; and 0 otherwise. Trade Balance.
∫ Ω ( )Ĩ ( , ) , * ( , ) , * ( , ) = ∫ Ω * ( )Ĩ * ( , ) * , ( , ) * , ( , ) whereĨ ( , ) equals one if firm ω exports and zero otherwise.
Steady state equilibrium
We solve the model in steady state, and therefore drop the argument t. Let w j be the wage rate in country j. Let p j (ω) be the price of good ω produced in country j. In equilibrium a producer charges the same price independently of destination, so we do not introduce additional notation. Consumers solve 
where is income in country and P j is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price in country j:
The problem of the firm can be split into a static decision and a dynamic decision. The first involves how much to produce and the price given their current productivity, and the second involves how much to innovate and, for non-exporters, whether to become exporters. The static decision results from solving: The solution to these problems is the mark-up rule ( ) = ( ) = ( ) = −1 ( ) −1 −1 . Let̂( , , ) be the variable profits for a non-exporter (profits before paying innovation or exporting costs) and̂( , , ) be the same for exporters.̂(
In what follows we drop the name of the good ω, since all that matters for profits is z. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for exporters is
For non-exporters, the dynamic problem consists of determining when to become an exporter and how much to innovate 7 . Let z xj be the optimal size at which firms become exporters. Their problem is, for ∈ [1, ]
.
Equation (9) is the smooth pasting condition. It imposes that the change in value at the point of the switch in status is equal before and after switching. Equation (10) imposes that the value of the firm must be the same before and after switching. The free entry condition is
Characterizing the steady state
Exporters. The linearity in profits and the functional form of the innovation function guarantee that V x (z) is homogeneous of degree 1. The solution implies that the productivity of exporters grows at a constant rate, and is therefore independent of firm size. Thus, Gibrat's law holds. This rate of growth is
This rate is increasing in profits and decreasing in innovation costs. 8 The value function is
Non-exporters. The first-order condition to the non-exporter problem is
Introducing the solution in the Bellman equation, we have:
Equation (15) defines a first-order differential equation that pins down the non-exporter's value function (and growth rate). The boundary conditions are given by the value matching and smooth pasting conditions. Together, these imply the following:
Equation (15) cannot be solved in closed form. However, we can characterize an implicit solution for the nonexporter's growth rate. 9 Proposition 1 shows how trade barriers affect the non-exporting sector.
Proposition 1
The non-exporter growth rate is (i) increasing in z, (ii) decreasing in τ xj and κ xj and (iii) weakly smaller than the exporter growth rate.
Proof.
We omit the country subindices for the proof. Notice that (i) and the previously derived condition that g d (z x ) = g x imply (iii). So we only need to prove (i) and (ii). To see (ii), first note that ( ) = ′ ( ) from the first-order condition. Thus, we can rewrite equation (15) as
The proof works by showing ( )/ < 0 and ( )/ < 0. Using equation (17), this implies that for any arbitrary z, ( )/ < 0 and ( )/ < 0. The value function is
Applying the envelope theorem delivers the result (note that / < 0). To see point (i), insert the firstorder condition into the Bellman equation for non-exporters to obtain ( + ) ( ) = [ + 2 ( ) 2 ] . Differentiating both sides and rearranging,
We show ′ ( ) > 0 by showing that the denominator in the left-hand side is positive. This denominator is a polynomial, and as such can be written as a function of its roots:
. This holds if g 1 < g d (z) < g 2 . To see this, note that if π d was replaced by π x , g 1 would be equal to g x . In fact, g 1 is the growth rate of a firm that expects to make profits π d forever, or, in other words, if τ x (κ x ) → ∞. Since we showed already ( )/ < 0, this implies (z) . This implies that the denominator in the left-hand side of equation (18) is positive, and thus ′ ( ) > 0. □ The intuition behind Proposition 1 is the following. The possibility of future exports represents an option value for the firm. The value depends on the probability that the firm will become an exporter (i.e., will not die before reaching z x ). As firms grow they approach z x and the probability increases. The present value of the firm increases faster, and the growth rate increases (the second derivative ′′ ( ) is positive, so through equation (14), g d (z) is increasing). In turn, the option value is increasing in exporting profits. Higher trade costs reduce those profits, thereby reducing the innovation and growth rates of non-exporters. Similarly, a higher sunk export cost increases the threshold z x , making exporting more difficult to achieve and reducing the option value as well as innovation itself. Thus, policies that affect the exporting sector have a direct effect, through firm life cycle, on the non-exporting sector.
These are new predictions about the effect of trade barriers on non-exporters that challenge the existing literature. First, they suggest that firms that anticipate exporting may start growing faster before beginning to export. This is consistent with what Bernard and Jensen (1999) find for US firms. Based on their findings, they conclude that firms became better for reasons other than exporting, and that such firms export as a byproduct of their increased productivity. Our model suggests that their productivity grew faster because they knew they would become exporters.
Second, our predictions have implications for the literature that measures the impact of trade costs on firm productivity by using non-exporters as a control group, that is, assuming that trade costs do not affect them. We find that trade barriers also affect non-exporters.
The firm size distribution. The model delivers the distribution of exporters in closed form solution. To characterize the full distribution, we approximate the differential equation determining the growth rate of non exporters using the functional form ( ) = ( + + 2 + 3 ) −1 , where a, b, c, and d are parameters to be determined in equilibrium. We show in A that the steady-state distribution is:
where
It is straightforward to see that μ j satisfies Zipf's law. This law states that the upper tail of the distribution of firms according to employees (or sales) follows a Pareto distribution. The upper tail is completely populated by exporters. The distribution of exporters is Pareto in z. Since employees (and sales) are linearly proportional to z, this satisfies Zipf's law.
Solution to the system. Given this distribution, we solve for the equilibrium in each country by solving a system of three unknowns (π dj , M j and w j ) and three equations: free entry (11), labor-market clearing (2), and trade balance.
It is convenient to rewrite labor-market clearing and trade balance in terms of the unknowns. Labor market clearing is
and trade balance is
Given w j , we pin down prices p(z). With π dj , we determine the labor used in production per firm, their innovation and the distribution of firms up to a scalar M j . Aggregate productivity. We derive a measure of productivity as in Atkeson and Burstein (2010) . This is output per production worker, where output is defined as the CES aggregate good (Q j in equation (1)). We show in Appendix B that the following holds: = where N pj is labor used in production and Z j is a constant (productivity), with
( ) is a measure of the average productivity of the domestic firms, and ∫ ∞ * * ( ) is a measure of the average productivity of imports.
The closed economy
In the closed economy, there is only one type of firm, and their maximization problem is similar to the problem of exporters. Notice that we need to normalize one price for each economy, so that w j = 1 for all j.
Static profits are given by π j (z) = π j z, and the value function is ( ) = , where = ( + ) (1 − √1 − ℎ ) where ℎ = 2 /(( + ) 2 ). The free-entry condition pins down the rate of growth of firms in the economy by setting = = (1). The distribution of firms is given by ( ) = − / .
Open vs. closed economies
Next, we compare two types of results based on the open and closed economy assumptions. First, we show that the closed economy underestimates innovation costs, because it does not capture the innovation incentives associated with exporting. Our findings indicate that exporting not only increases the innovation of exporters, but also of non-exporters who anticipate becoming exporters in the future. Second, we compare the effect of increasing innovation costs on welfare, and find that the closed economy always exaggerates the welfare loss. In our analysis, exporters shift sales towards the export market when faced with larger domestic innovation costs. The reason is that higher innovation costs reduce profits, which reduces domestic income, lowering domestic demand relative to foreign demand. Thus, the reduction in demand faced by firms in the closed economy is larger than that faced by firms in the open economy, amplifying the response of aggregate welfare.
Estimates of innovation costs
The key calibration target to estimate these costs in the closed economy is the slope of the upper tail of the distribution of firms. In the open economy, we draw additional information from export data: the share of firms that export and the ratio of exports to total sales in an economy. When data on export behavior is not considered, something is lost. This section derives analytical results to understand what exactly is lost and how it affects estimates and counterfactuals. Section 5 shows the magnitude of these differences when the model is calibrated to key moments in the data.
We set the innovation costs in the closed and open economies so that the distribution of large firms is the same in both economies. Large firms are the exporters in the open economy, as are all firms in the closed economy.
Proposition 2 shows that the estimated innovation costs under the closed economy assumption are always smaller than under the open economy assumption. Further, in a corollary we show that openness affects countries differently, and as a result country efficiency rankings may change.
Proposition 2
Assume Proof. See Appendix C. The proof arrives, via algebra calculations, to the following expression:
Since profits are always positive and by Proposition 1, g xj > g dj (1), the right hand side of the above equation is positive. Thus, it must be the case that 1 > 1 , or < . □
The closed economy, therefore, underestimates innovation costs. Intuitively, the reason is that trade adds incentives for innovation. If the incentives are greater, the estimation delivers higher costs to generate the same slope of the distribution of firms. In the quantitative section, we show that the downward bias of domestic innovation costs in the closed economy assumption effect is actually sizeable.
Notice that we can use equation (22) to identify the effects of the additional incentives that exporting provides on the bias in innovation costs. Let̃be the rate of growth chosen by a firm that would never expect to export (for example, if = ∞ for that firm). This rate of growth is
Inserting this into equation (22),
Notice the intuition behind equation (23). The bias depends on static and dynamic components. The last term on the right hand side measures the static component: it is a function of the additional profits an exporter receives. The first two terms on the right hand side of equation (23) are the dynamic components in the bias. 2 −̃2 is a measure of the additional incentives of exporters. However, not all firms export so not all firms face these additional incentives. Equation (23) adjusts this difference by subtracting the term (1) 2 −̃. This difference is the additional incentives non-exporters have because of the possibility of exporting in the future.
The fact that (1) 2 >̃follows from Proposition 1. This suggests that non exporters invest to export, that is, they increase their growth rate anticipating higher returns in the future, when they become exporters. By increasing their growth rates, these firms start exporting sooner, increasing the present value of the firm.
What about the differences between two countries? Suppose 2 < 1 . What is 2 − 1 ?
Corollary 1 The difference in innovation cost estimates between countries in the closed economy model is given by
where 0 < 1 = < 1, 2 = > 0 and̃= ( + )(1 − √1 − ℎ ), ℎ = ( + ) 2 is the rate at which a firm would grow if it never expects to export.
Proof.
See Appendix D. □ Corollary 1 splits the estimated difference in innovation costs into three components. The first component is the difference in innovation costs under the open economy assumption. The larger this difference, the larger the difference in the estimates under the closed economy, since α > 0. The second component depends on the innovation incentives for exporters, relative to a hypothetical firm that never expects to export 11 (g xi −̃i). The third component relates to the incentives for non-exporters. The difference (1) −̃denotes the additional incentives of an entrant that expects to export in the future relative to a firm that would never do so. The implication of (1) >̃is that firms invest to export. 12
Counterfactuals
We show that, for a special case, the closed economy overpredicts the effects of counterfactuals on productivity and welfare whenever domestic firms shift output toward exports when innovation costs increase. This special case assumes that κ x = 0, so all firms export. Moreover, if σ ≤ 3/2, we show that an increase in innovation costs drives firms to increase the share of output exported. These are sufficient conditions that simplify the algebra considerably, allowing us to make compelling theoretical statements about the effects of changing innovation costs.
The intuition underlying this result is the following. Consider an increase in the domestic κ I . On the one hand, this drives firms to reduce innovation, decreasing aggregate productivity and welfare. On the other hand, associated with the increase in κ I is an aggregate negative income effect, which reduces profits, and thus innovation, productivity and welfare fall even more. In the open economy, faced with the reduction in domestic demand, firms increase the proportion of exports in total sales, thereby reducing their losses. Thus, welfare falls less than in the closed economy model.
We start by showing some closed-form solutions for key variables in equilibrium, and then use these forms to prove the main proposition of this section: that in the closed economy, counterfactuals are overpredicted in the closed economy. An argument similar to that set forth in Section 2.2 shows that g x (z) = g x for all z. That is, as before, all exporters grow at the same, constant rate, independently of size. Also, it is easy to show that the value function in equilibrium is ( ) = . Evaluating at z = 1 and adding the free-entry condition shows that in equilibrium, the growth rate of exporters is = . This demonstrates clearly the effect of a change in innovation costs on firm growth rates, that is, = − 2 . From this, we derive closed-form solutions for the distribution of firms. Recall that the distribution of firms is ( ) = − , so we need a closed-form solution for M. Market clearing determines M:
Next, by normalizing L = 1 we can rewrite the value function for an entrant as (1) = + 2 2 = . Thus,
+ 1). Rearranging terms and replacing g x with its value in equilibrium gives
We then define Z x as the productivity in the open economy and Z c as the analogue under the closed economy assumption. The following proposition states the relationship between these two. 
Proof.
Start with the definition of Z x and Z c .
Next let μ c (z) be the distribution in the closed economy. Since the growth rate of firms must be the same in the open and closed economies to match the same distribution of firms in equilibrium, it follows that μ c (z) = μ(z) for all z, and ∫
Note the intuition underlying this proposition. Productivity in the open economy is productivity in the closed economy times the ratio π x /π d , which is larger than one. More importantly, a change in innovation costs will affect productivity in the open economy in two ways: the direct effect on the distribution of firms, which operates exactly as in the closed economy, and the effect on firms' exposure to trade. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4
When changing innovation costs, the change in productivity in the open economy relative to the close economy is equal to the change in π x relative to π d . That is,
Proof. The proof is in E. Intuitively, we first show = . According to the proposition, when κ I increases, Z c falls and Z x falls, but π x /π d increases, so the change in Z c is larger than the change in Z x . □
Corollary 2
If σ < 3/2, a change in κ I has a larger effect on aggregate productivity in the closed economy than in the open economy.
Proof. See E. Intuitively, σ < 3/2 guarantees that ( / ) > 0. □ Corollary 2 is only a sufficient condition. Numerically, we found ( / ) > 0 is true for all values of σ. A small σ helps because it increases the returns to scale in the economy, and thereby increases the gains from trade. In the extreme case where σ = ∞, there are no gains from trade.
Data and calibration

Data
We use the European Firms In a Global Economy (EFIGE) database, which contains detailed information for almost 15,000 manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees in seven European countries: Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and the UK. By running the same survey across all firms in these countries, this dataset was designed to be comparable across countries, overcoming some of the problems of alternative databases.
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Austria and Hungary are not included in the analysis, as their data samples are too small (less than 500 firms in each country).
14 We exclude firms that do not export but maintain some kind of international activity, such as importing, being part of a multinational, or investing abroad, since we do not model these activities. The remaining sample is of 13,401 firms.
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First we document large differences in employee-size distributions across the European countries. France, Germany, and the UK have relatively larger firms than Italy and Spain. The latter countries have the lowest productivity in the sample according to several definitions of productivity 16 , an observation that is consistent with Tybout (2000) , who surveyed the literature on firm size distribution and noted that countries with relatively smaller firms have lower GDP per capita.
To compare the firm size distributions across countries, we perform a statistical test. We do so via the following regression to three different groups of firms: all firms, exporters, and non-exporters.
where y ij is the logarithm of firms larger than n ij , n ij is the number of employees in firm i in country j, and d ij is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i belongs to country j, and zero otherwise, for j = France, Italy, Spain and UK. The error term is ε ij .
We are interesting in the coefficients α 2j . If these are significantly different than zero, the slope of the distribution in country j is statistically different from Germany's. Table 1 shows our results. For exposition purposes, we only report the estimates and p-values for the different α j 's in each regression. Our results show that in all cases except one, the distributions are statistically different using a 1% confidence level. The exception is that the slope of the firm size distributions of non-exporters in Germany and France are not statistically different from each other. 18 One determinant that is potentially relevant is export status. To further explore the differences in the slopes of the firm size distribution based on export status, we perform the following regression:
whereĨ is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i in country j exports, 0 otherwise. β dj is the estimate of the slope of the firm size distribution for non-exporters in country j and β xj does similarly for exporters.
With this regression, our goal is to check whether the differences in the slope of the firm size distributions are larger among exporters than non-exporters. That is, we test whether − ′ is different than − ′ , for all j, j′. To do so, we perform a Wald test. In particular, the null hypothesis to test is , − , = , − , for j = France, Italy, Spain and UK. Table 2 shows our results. It is not always the case that differences are larger among exporters: in fact, the differences among exporting firms in Germany and France are smaller than that of non-exporters in those countries, and there are no significant differences in UK. But the differences in Spain and Italy are larger among exporters.
The fact that Spain and Italy are the countries whose distributions differ the most, and these differences are highlighted among exporters, suggests that incorporating export status is key to understand where the differences lie. Table 2 : Wald tests to measure the difference in distribution slopes between exporters and non-exporters.
Null hypothesis
Estimated value Probability of accepting null
Calibration
We add labor and corporate taxes to the analysis. Labor tax data, which are from McDaniel (2007) using the 2007-2009 average, drive a wedge between the labor cost faced by firms and that received by a worker, so that if a worker receives a wage w, the cost per employee for a firm is (1 + τ l )w, where τ l is the labor tax rate. Profit tax data are from the Doing Business report for 2012 (the only year with data). Firms maximize after-tax profits (1 − τ c )π, where τ c is the corporate tax rate. Innovation is not deducted from taxes.
To calibrate the rest of the world, we normalize the iceberg trade cost for one country (we set τ x,GER = 0).
This does not affect the ratio
, and it implies that we do not need to calibrate the rest of the world. Thus, our trade costs are relative to Germany's.
Calibration strategy
The following parameters are calibrated independently: tax rate, size of the economy, and death rate. We calibrate the parameters κ I , τ x and κ x jointly to match the slope of the distribution of large firms, the share of firms that export, and the aggregate trade volume, defined as the sum of exports divided by total sales. g xj is determined by the slope of the distribution of firms. z xj is sensitive to the fraction of exporters and τ xj is sensitive to the export volume.
Upper tail of the distribution. First, from the slope of the firm size distribution we determine the exporter growth rate in equilibrium. From equation (19), the distribution of exporters in country j is ( ) = − , where A j is a constant defined in equation (19) . To be consistent with Figure 9 through Figure 11 , we focus on the measure
with̃= ln ( −1 ). Thus, the slope of the distribution is (1 − ). Given δ, this determines g xj . From equation (6) g xj determines the value of , which allows us to write κ Ij as a function of . Simultaneously, since = + (1 + ) 1− * , we end up with κ Ij as a function of and τ xj (assuming that * is known, which we deal with shortly).
Share of exporters. Given g xj , we choose the value of z xj such that we match the share of firms that export in each country. That is,
Trade volume. The next key target is the ratio of exports to total sales, or trade volume. Trade volume in country j is
where ( * ) is the labor tax in country j (rest of the world). The calibration works by finding the values of κ Ij , κ xj and τ xj such that equations (24), (25) and (26) hold in equilibrium.
Rest of the world. So far we have assumed that the demand and supply of the rest of the world is known. Next we explain how we parameterize this. Foreign demand for each good is
The supply is the right-hand side of the trade balance equation, which is
The parameters to be calibrated are therefore * /( * (1+ * )) and * = (1+ * ) 1− ((1+ * ) * ) 1− ∫ ∞ * * ( ).
First, note that we cannot identify * /( * (1 + * )) from the τ xj 's, since the terms are always together. We normalize τ x,GER = 0, and therefore express each countrys trade costs relative to Germany's. Thus, we calibrate * (1+ * ) * so that equation (26) holds for Germany with τ x,GER = 0. We then set τ xj , j ≠ GER so that equation (26) holds for all other countries given the value of * (1+ * ) * . This identifies the iceberg cost in country j relative to Germany's iceberg cost.
Similarly, we proceed to calibrate the supply from the rest of the world, which is used to find relative wages across countries. The trade balance equation can be written as
As it turns out, the value of this expression is not important, as long as it is the same for every country. The trade balance equation determines relative wages. Divide the value of exports in country j by the analogue for Germany, using w GER = 1 as the numeraire:
Given π dj we can determine z xj , z x,GER and μ j (z), μ GER (z), pinning down the left-hand side. On the right-hand side the only unknown in this equation is w j .
Calibration targets
The numeraire is the wage rate in Germany, which we set to 1. We set ρ = 0.04, δ = 0.06 and σ = 5, following Atkeson and Burstein (2010) . 19 We use the EFIGE database to calibrate the size of each economy L i , the innovation cost κ Ii , the fixed export cost κ xi and the variable export cost τ xi (four parameters per country). We use four targets from the EFIGE database and clean the database by eliminating firms that do not export but have some foreign operations, such as importing and investing abroad. Altomonte and Aquilante (2012) details how the data was collected and reviews some measures that confirm its representativeness. The targets are:
• The number of workers in each country;
• The slope of the distribution of exporters. We calculate the slope by focusing on firms with more than 29 employees since we are mostly interested in the upper tail 20 ;
• The share of firms that export;
• The value of exports relative to the value of production (trade volume). This is problematic since firms do not report their sales. However, they do report the number of employees and the share of output exported. Thus, our measure of trade volume in country i is the sum of employees in country i times the export ratio divided by the sum of employees in country i. Table 3 shows the calibration targets. One problem with this database is that the trade volume in Germany seems too small relative to aggregate figures. While the Bruegel institute, that prepared this database, claims that this is representative, we asked about this problem and they offered no satisfactory answer. This being said, we still choose to calibrate to these figures, with the caveat that this trade volume is rather small in Germany. A key step in this calibration is the approximation of non-exporter growth rates. In G we show the values for the fitted parameters and compare the numerical solution to the approximation for the growth rates and value functions. Figure 12 through Figure 16 in G show that, in most cases, the approximation is indistinguishable from the numerical solution. Table 4 contains the values for calibration of the key parameters and the implied exporter growth rates. Notice that these costs are all relative to entry costs, which are normalized to 1. For ease of exposition, we also display the relative costs across countries, normalizing them relative to Germany's. Consider Italy and Spain, the countries with the flattest distributions. This flatness is consistent with the low rates of growth we have identified. Italy has low growth rates mainly because innovation costs are 33% higher than in Germany. Spain, on the other hand, has a hard time exporting, which costs 43% more for Spain than Germany.
We can also learn from the behavior of the remaining countries. France has higher costs than Germany, particularly higher sunk export costs, and still its exporters grow faster. The larger sunk export costs act as a barrier to entry into the export market, which reduces competition; and as a result insiders enjoy larger profits and innovate more, growing faster. 21 UK exporters grow fast because sunk export costs are higher and the variable trade costs are lower than in Germany. This more than compensates for a slightly higher cost of innovation, resulting in a higher growth rate.
Before moving any further, we try to understand the magnitude of these estimates, by focusing on innovation costs and iceberg costs. Innovation costs are related to the ease with which firms grow. For example, our estimates suggest that it is much costlier to grow in Italy than in any other country in the sample. This result is supported by World Bank estimates of the ease of doing business in each country based on a number of costs, such as those related to construction permits, registering property, obtaining credit, and enforcing contracts. Based on these (and additional) categories, the World Bank ranks each country; these rankings are shown in Table 5 alongside our estimates of innovation costs. The order of the World Bank ranking agrees with our estimates. The only exception is the UK, where it is easier to do business than in Germany according to the report, but not according to our estimates of innovation costs.
Next we turn to iceberg costs. Waugh (2010) estimates trade costs for many countries, including all the countries we consider except Germany. Table 6 shows his estimates of trade costs relative to France for the four countries we have in common as well as our estimates. Both show that Spanish trade costs are the highest, although our differences are larger than his. 22 Another characteristic that may contribute to Spain's high export costs is its distance from customers relative to the other countries, which naturally increases transport costs. Table 7 reports the share of exports within Europe, to North America, and to South and Central America (based on EFIGE data on where products are shipped). The farthest destination is South and Central America, and the country exporting the most to South and Central America is Spain. There is additional data that supports our findings regarding high exports costs in Spain. The World Bank reports measures of export costs. These measures are used as reference when comparing countries that choose similar export methods. This is the case of Italy and Spain, two peninsulas, with a natural advantage in maritime exporting. The World Bank reports two significant differences that increase export costs in Spain relative to Italy: (i) Spanish exports require 50% more paperwork than Italian exports (an average of 4 documents in Italy vs. 6 in Spain); and (ii) the time required for Spanish goods to reach the port of departure after leaving the factory is 50% longer (2.6 days in Italy vs. 4 days in Spain). This last point may well be due to geography. While both countries are peninsulas, Italy has a relatively narrower land area surrounded by water. Thus, there are many more ports in Italy than Spain: 212 vs. 105. These are the total number of ports, but only the largest are used to export goods. In Spain, Barcelona is the only large port, while Italy has five major ports: Genoa, La Spezia, Livorno, Venice, and Naples. 23 6 The model along non-targeted dimensions
Value added per worker: model vs. data
Value added per worker data is from Eurostat, specifically the average from 2004 through 2010. As shown in Figure 1 , the model performs exceptionally well, accounting for a large fraction of the differences in value added per worker in the manufacturing sector in these economies. Table 8 provides the value added per worker in the data with the model, showing that the model accounts for 54-87 percent of the differences. It is worth mentioning that the accounting of the closed economy model would be very similar, except that the closed economy would attribute this entirely to differences in innovation costs, ignoring the effect of trade barriers. Figure 2 , the model does a good job of generating the wage differences we observe in the data. 
Innovation: model vs. data
We compare innovation in the model with R&D in the data. The EFIGE database has information on the fraction of employees devoted to R&D in each firm. However, since R&D is only part of innovation, we cannot compare the two numbers directly. Instead, we assume that the share of R&D to total innovation is constant in all firms, normalize everything so that the data and model are the same in Germany, and compare it to the levels of the other countries. We ignore missing information observations for our comparison. The model performs particularly well for Italy. In Spain, France and the UK it predicts too many employees will go into R&D. The UK has a relatively low level of R&D when compared to the rest of the countries. A reason why the model might fail for the UK is that many of these firms perform their R&D expenditures abroad, particularly in the United States, as documented by Griffith, Harrison, and Reenen (2006) .
Results: open vs. closed economies
We next compare our results with a closed economy model. Because the closed model is what most of the literature focuses on, our results can provide guidance as to how the predictions of such models would be affected by adding international trade. Examples of such models are Luttmer (2007 Luttmer ( , 2010 , and Acemoglu and Cao (2015) , who develop closed economy models in which firms decide how much to grow by making investments in innovation.
Estimates of innovation costs
Proposition 2 states that the closed economy underestimates innovation costs. Table 9 shows quantitatively the bias introduced by assuming the economy is closed. 24 In the first column, we normalize the innovation cost in the open economy in Germany to one, and express every other cost in terms of it. The second column shows, in absolute terms, the bias implied by assuming the economy is closed. In the third column, we express the innovation costs in the closed economy relative to Germany to create a ranking of the countries costs and compare those costs with the open economy. The bias introduced by the closed economy assumption is between 22 percent and 35 percent. The country with the largest distortion, both in terms of the actual cost and relative to the other countries, is Italy. Interestingly, the order of the innovation costs ranking changes when we assume the economies are closed. In particular, both France and the UK have innovation costs that are larger than Germany's when modelling the open economy, but they appear to be smaller than Germany's under the closed economy assumption.
Corollary 1 provides some intuition as to why the bias is different across countries. The bias will be larger when (i) the difference in actual costs is large; (ii) the difference in exporter growth rates is large; and (iii) the difference in the growth rates of entrants is large. Comparing Italy with Germany, we have already concluded that (i) and (ii) are true, thus accounting for the large bias. Table 10 shows how the terms in equation (23) account for the bias in the difference 1 − 1 . The difference between the first two columns represent the dynamic components of the bias 25 (related to future gains), and the third column represents the static component, as explained in Proposition 2. The fact that stands out the most is how the dynamic component is smaller for Italy and Spain, especially related to the gains once firms become exporters. At the other extreme, in Spain the bias in innovation costs is similar to Germany's. As it turns out, the closed economy assumption is not so inaccurate for either country. In Germany, this is because the domestic economy is large and therefore more significant in relation to the rest of the world, while in Spain, this is due to high export costs.
In terms of Corollary 1, while the exporter growth rates are different in these two countries, the entrant growth rate is actually greater in Spain. This compensates for the difference in the exporter growth rate and results in the bias being similar in both countries. Intuitively, the reason why entrant growth rates are so high in Spain is that innovation costs are relatively low and there is not much competition due to high export costs. 26 However, these high trade costs reduce the incentives to innovate, and therefore firm innovation growth is limited.
It is also interesting to compare Spain with France. Under the open economy model, they both have similar innovation costs, but France's costs drop by almost 10 percentage points under the closed economy model, while Spain's remain constant. France's export costs are much lower than Spain's, so the closed economy model introduces a larger bias in France.
Counterfactuals: innovation costs
Proposition 4 showed that counterfactuals react more in the closed economy than in the open economy. Some assumptions are necessary to prove the theoretical results; these assumptions are not met in the quantitative section (for example, no fixed export costs). In this section, we show that in the calibrated model, the closed economy also amplifies the response to counterfactuals. Table 11 shows the elasticity of productivity given a 0.5% change in innovation costs for each country, and compares the closed and open economy predictions. In the closed economy, the elasticity is between 43 and 73 percent larger than in the open economy. These differences are similar for welfare, as shown in Table 12 . Welfare is the aggregate consumption good C as a measure of welfare. For country j,
From the derivation of productivity, C j = Z j L pj , where L pj is labor used in production. As Proposition 4 suggests, productivity reacts more in the closed economy model than in the open economy because increases in innovation costs bring about losses, and exporters can hedge against these losses by focusing more intensively on the foreign market. Table 13 shows the share of exports to total sales per exporter in each country with the calibrated innovation costs, and when these costs increase by 5 percent. Exporters shift their sales toward the export market. 
Counterfactuals: iceberg trade costs
The tractability of our model allows us to characterize very precisely the reaction of firms (both exporters and non-exporters) to a change in trade costs. Proposition 1 states that a reduction in trade costs would trigger an increase in the growth rate of non-exporters, in addition to the increase in the growth rate of exporters. While the proposition is based on partial equilibrium, we show in this section that it extends to general equilibrium. Figure  4 through Figure 8 show the behavior of non-exporter growth rates, before and after a 10 percent reduction in iceberg trade costs. The x-axis shows the productivity of the firm, while the y-axis shows the growth rate. The numbers on the x-axis represent export thresholds and the numbers on the y-axis represent exporter growth rates.
As Proposition 1 suggests, the rate of growth is increasing in z and equals the growth rate of exporters at the switching threshold z x . A reduction in trade costs increases the growth rate for everyone, exporters and non-exporters. It also increases the ratio of exporting firms by lowering the threshold z x . The fact that non-exporter behavior changes in response to a change in trade costs has, to the best of our knowledge, not been highlighted so far from a theoretical point of view, with the exception of Piguillem and Rubini (2017) . This is consistent with Yan-Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011), who by structurally estimating a model of trade with R&D, find that a reduction in trade costs increases the R&D of non-exporters.
Moreover, this contributes to the discussion of whether firms learn by exporting or export because they learn how to be more productive. If firms learn by exporting, then we should observe accelerating growth rates after firms enter the export market. Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that US exporters increase their growth rates before exporting, concluding that there is no evidence of learning by exporting, and therefore trade barriers have little or no effect on firm growth rates. Our model suggests that this observation is consistent with trade barriers being the source of the faster growth: when a firm anticipates becoming an exporter, it is optimal for it to grow faster before exporting.
The positive effect of trade barriers on non-exporters, therefore, suggests the need to be careful when selecting a control group to study those effects. This should be taken into account in papers, such as Van Biesebroeck (2005) and De Loecker (2007), that establish non-exporter firms as a control group.
Next, we consider the aggregate effects of changing trade costs. Atkeson and Burstein (2010) show that adding innovation into a model of trade does not substantially change the gains from reducing iceberg trade costs. Our findings confirm their results. We simulate a reduction in trade costs to determine the elasticity of productivity, then compare these numbers with those of a model with two symmetric countries and no innovation or fixed export costs, from which we have obtained the elasticity in closed-form solution. We recalibrate this economy so that the trade volumes are the same as in the benchmark model. These numbers are reported in Table 14 . We also report the implied iceberg costs estimated, which are very different than the ones estimated under the benchmark model. The gains in the model with no innovation are only the direct gains, that is, less is lost in transit. This implies that any gain in innovation by exporters will be offset by a corresponding reduction in innovation by non-exporters and the measure of entrants in the economy.
Extensions
The model is flexible enough to allow a large number of extensions, and we illustrate this by incorporating two in this section. The first one introduces firms that never become exporters. We model this by assuming that κ x → ∞ for these firms. Brooks and Dovis (2011) find that in Colombia some large firms choose not to export no matter how large, or how big a trade liberalization. We incorporate this option in the current extension. The second extension introduces a changing death rate for large firms. It is well understood that young firms are more likely to die than old firms. To capture this, we relax our assumption of a fixed death rate and assume that the rate drops after firms reach a certain age. Brooks and Dovis (2011) show that a trade liberalization in Colombia had a strong effect on young firms, encouraging them to export. However, the effects on old firms were much lower, suggesting that some firms are just not willing to export, no matter the trade costs.
Introducing never exporters to the model
The goal of this section is to test whether adding firms that never export affect the results. To incorporate this, we keep the base structure, except for the sunk export cost κ x . Under the current extension, there are two sunk export costs, randomly assigned to each entrant. Once this cost is known, the firm keeps it forever. With probability p n ∈ (0, 1), the fixed export cost is κ x = ∞, in which case the firm would never export. With probability 1 − p n the export cost is κ x < ∞, and we calibrate this cost following the procedures outlined in Section 4.2. We calibrate p n to match the share of non-exporters within the largest 10% of firms in each country.
Effectively, this introduces an additional barrier to exporting: not only do we have a sunk export cost and a variable iceberg cost, but we also have a measure of firms that will never export. All these are allowed to change across countries.
In terms of the model, the necessary modifications are as follows. The first regards the free entry condition. If we denote V n (z) the value function of a firm with κ x = ∞ and V p (z) (p for potential exporter) the value function of a firm with κ x < ∞, then the free entry condition becomes
The second modification pertains to the decisions by the new never exporters. It is straightforward to see that the problem of these firms is similar to that of exporters, except that their static profits are π d z rather than π x z. As a result, it is easy to see that they will choose a constant rate of growth, equal to
Notice that, as in the case with exporters, this rate is independent of z. The third and last modification pertains the steady state firm size distribution. To compute this distribution, we note that the distribution of never exporters is
where A n is a constant determined by an initial condition. This initial condition specifies that, of the total mass of entering firms, a proportion p n become never exporters. That is,
where M is the mass of firms, determined as before. Finally, the firm size distribution is
Note that this implies that the upper tail of the distribution is no longer populated only by exporters. The upper tail is a weighted sum of two Pareto distributions, and since these weights change, the weighted sum is no longer a Pareto distribution. However, as z increases, so does the weight of the exporter distribution, since exporters grow faster. In the limit as z → ∞, there are only exporters (and the distribution is Pareto). Consequently, we ignore the fact that there are non-exporters at the top for calibration purposes. We set parameters so that the upper tail of the distribution of exporters matches the slope of the entire distribution. We acknowledge that the calibration is not fully consistent with the implications of the model, but it has the advantage of targeting the same moments as the benchmark case, providing a clean robustness exercise, the main goal of this section. 27 The shares of non-exporters within the 10 percent largest firms in each country is 14% in France, 22% in Germany, 8% in Italy, 15% in Spain, and 22% in the UK. Table 15 summarizes the implied costs under the new specification. The calibrated shares of old firms that do not export, p n , is always larger than the actual share of firms observed as non-exporters within the largest 10% of firms. This is natural, since exporters (and potential exporters) grow faster than those that never hope to export. Given a constant death probability, this implies that exporters are more likely to populate the top of the distribution. So, for example, for there to be 22% of non-exporters among the largest 10% of firms as in Germany, the starting share of firms with κ x = ∞ is 31%.
Note that results do not change much with respect to the benchmark calculations, except for Italy. The reason is that most countries have similar levels of firms starting off as never exporters, between 25 and 35 percent. In Italy only about 14% of firms are born as never exporters. This small new "barrier" implies that, all else being equal, Italy should have a larger trade volume and more firms exporting. To match the same level of exports, both κ x and τ x increase relative to Germany in the benchmark model. Also, since exporters and potential exporters grow faster than never exporters, this pushes the growth rates of Italian firms to higher levels than in other countries, pushing the slope of the firm size distribution to become flatter. To match the observed slope, the innovation costs increase, from 30% larger than Germany's, to 80%.
Differing death rates
A counterfactual assumption in the model is that all firms die at the same rate, when the data suggests that young firms are much more likely to die than older ones, as Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) find, among others. We do not introduce this feature in our benchmark model because there is no reason to suspect that this is related to exporting. However, we presently introduce this option to explore the effect of these differing rates.
To replicate this, we introduce differing death rates in this section. More specifically, we assume that firms die at a rate of δ 1 = 25% when young, and by the time they reach a size ẑ(which can also be specified in time as opposed to size), this rate drops to δ 2 = 4%. We calibrate ẑin each country so that the overall death rate is 6%, as in the benchmark model.
Theoretically, this extension introduces one additional constraint to the problem, that forces us to distinguish between the value function of a young, small firm, that faces a large death rate, and that of large, low death probability firms. The calibrated model implies that, for all countries, the transition to a low death probability occurs before exporting, that is, for all countries,̂< . Thus, the new Jacobi-Bellman-Hamilton equations are
The other new element to determine the equilibrium is the following value matching condition: 28 Table 16 shows the calibrated parameters under this specification. The estimates of the costs do not differ much from the benchmark model, suggesting that the larger death rates of young firms are not essential to understand the barriers to firm growth. 
Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of whether including trade matters when studying barriers to firm growth. While the underlying idea is that it does, as shown by Melitz (2003) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) , papers measuring barriers to firm growth abstract from trade barriers to gain tractability. Using a tractable, dynamic model of trade with endogenous firm growth, we show the consequences of abstracting from trade from a qualitative and quantitative perspective. Qualitatively, the closed economy produces artificially low innovation costs and artificially high counterfactuals. Quantitatively, these effects are large: the closed economy alters the ranking of countries by innovation costs and amplifies the elasticity of welfare to innovation costs by between 31 and 64 percent.
In particular, a closed economy model would conclude that innovation costs in Italy are less problematic than what the open economy model suggests. Moreover, the closed economy model fails to identify the area where Italians excel: exporting. Also, the closed economy model would predict that changes that affect domestic innovation costs have effects that are too large on domestic macro aggregates, such as welfare and productivity. If such a model is used for policy when the economy is indeed open, the analysis will be biased and misleading by a quantitatively large amount.
Finally, we deliver a key message for the empirical estimates of gains from trade. Many trade econometricians estimate the effects of a change in trade policy by comparing the performance of exporters versus nonexporters, under the assumption that non-exporters are not affected by the change in policy. We find that their behavior is not exogenous: both exporters and non-exporters react to a change in trade costs. One prediction present in the literature is that firms that are about to become exporters speed up their growth, consistent with the findings in Bernard and Jensen (1999) . While they interpreted this as evidence that trade does not matter for firm growth, our results suggest that trade is key in driving this behavior. 
where g(z) = g x for exporters and g d (z) for non exporters. For exporters, integrating on both sides,
where C x is the constant of integration, and is determined using the border condition. Taking exponentials yields the distribution of exporters. For non exporters, we can only integrate both sides of (28) given our guess for the growth rates. The equation becomes
Integrating on both sides,
where C d is the constant of integration and is determined using the border condition μ(1) = 1 (the distribution is normalized by the measure of entrants M). Taking exponentials yields the distribution of non exporters.
B Productivity
The goal is to derive the reduced form for aggregate output
and N pj is labor used for production. Let n dj (z) denote labor for production of units sold domestically and , * ( ) for exports. With some algebra, we find
Labor used in production is
where * = (1 + * ) 1− ( * (1 + * )) 1− ∫ ∞ * * ( ). The left hand side of equation (29) is exports and the right hand side is imports. X * is supply of foreign goods, which we take as given following the small open economy assumption. We can rewrite total production labor as
C Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Using equation (15) evaluated at z = 1 and using the free-entry condition, 
Using equation (12) on the left hand side of the above equation,
To introduce , notice that in the closed economy the following must hold:
Introducing the last expression in equation (30) and simplifying,
From free entry in the closed economy, = , so
Replacing D j = 1 + τ xj in (31), we obtain (22). Since profits are always positive and by Proposition 1, g xj > g dj (1), the right hand side of the above equation is positive. Thus, it must be the case that 1 > 1 , or < . □
D Proof of Corollary 1
Taking the difference of (20) for the two countries and reorganizing: Because of the definition of exporters's profits
Using the optimal innovation policy of the exporter
Therefore:
for all i.
where (1) ≥ = (1 − √1 − ℎ )
E Proof of Proposition 5
When κ x = 0, given the closed form solution for the variables in equilibrium derived in the main section of the paper, and using trade balance, wages are
To solve this, we need to know the value of π d . Notice that
wherẽ= (1 + ) 1− * * 1− . Introducing in this expression the value for w defines the following implicit function
Next we build towards showing that > . We cannot show it generally, but we can find a sufficient condition for this to happen. This condition is that σ < 3/2.
We first show that < 0, which, by Proposition 4, implies that > . To show < 0 we proceed by contradiction. Thus, we show that if ≥ 0, then it must be the case that ≥ 0. But we also show that under our sufficient condition this cannot happen. We start by showing this last result, and then the main proposition.
Lemma 1
If σ < 3/2
Proof.
Using the implicit function theorem, we show that if σ < 3/2 then / < 0. Notice, this is a sufficient condition, but it will help us prove that / / > 0. Definê=
Then the equation that defineŝis
The implicit function theorem sayŝ= −Î t is easy to check that̂> 0. So we need to check that > 0.
The first term on the third line comes from rearranging the expression F. The second term comes from the expressions derived previously for π x /w and the equilibrium value for g x . Multiplying the equation by κ I gives < 0, this implies that > 0, which is a contradiction. 
F The firm size distributions in the data
G Fit of the approximation
Recall that our solution for the non exporter growth rate involves a differential equation with no closed form solution. Since we need a closed form to derive the distribution of firms, we approximate the non exporter with the following functional form
In this section, we discuss the goodness of this fit. Table 17 shows the values we compute for the variables a, b, c, and d for each country. Figure 12 through Figure 16 show how good this approximation is for the growth rates and the non exporter value function. 
H Alternative values of σ
Changing σ does not affect the computed values of the costs κ I and κ x , and only affects the estimates of τ x . Table  18 shows how these values change. Notice that when changing σ both the elasticity of substitution and a parameter that affects firm productivity are changing. This assumption follows Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and greatly simplifies the analysis by making profits linear in productivity.
There is no reason to believe this result would change if σ did not affect firm productivity, since one of the calibration targets is the trade volume. To see this, consider the result in Rubini (2014) that the effect of a larger σ is to amplify the share of imports within the economy, in a setting with innovation where σ does not affect the productivity of a firm. Intuitively, a larger σ increases the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods, driving consumers to purchase more imports that are relatively cheaper. Given that the export share is a target in the calibration, this would require a larger τ to offset this change. There is no reason to expect additional first order effects. It is not clear whether this bias would be larger for Germany or the other countries, having little effect on the relative cost, as in the present case.
Notes
1 See for example Hsieh and Klenow (2014) for barriers to firm growth, and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for barriers to firm size. 2 The reason why uncertainty increases the growth rate of non-exporters is that, because of the exit option, the value functions are convex, making firms risk lovers, and higher uncertainty increases their present value. This, paired with value functions starting at zero (and taking as given the exit and export thresholds), implies larger value function slopes, and these slopes directly determine firm growth. Even when allowing thresholds to change, we find quantitatively that higher uncertainty increases non-exporter average growth rates in Piguillem and Rubini (2017) . 3 Griffith, Harrison, and Reenen (2006) show that many UK firms perform their R&D activities abroad, mainly in the US. 4 We also assumed a world that contains only the countries in our sample and the results are very similar. log ( ), making it clear that the solution is smooth and can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a polynomial. In fact, the quantitative section shows that the fit of the approximation is very good. 11 While in the model every firm will export at some point,̃i is the growth rate of a hypothetical firm whose trade costs are infinite, and therefore never exports. 12 Notice that we require that in equilibrium (1) >̃. This holds in the quantitative section. 13 For example, see Gopinath et al. (2017) for a summary of the problems of using ORBIS when comparing firm data across countries. 14 Rubini et al. (2012) performs a similar analysis to this paper that includes all seven countries. 15 Figure 9 and Figure 10 would hardly change by including these firms. Figure 11 would, if it includes firms that belong to a multinational organization. 16 For example, Figure 1 shows how these countries compare in manufacturing value added per worker. 17 A graph of these distributions is included in Appendix F. 18 We also compute Wald tests to estimate the probability that α 2,i = α 2,j , for i ≠ j and i, j = France, Italy, Spain and UK. In all cases, the probability of accepting the null hypothesis is 0 at the 1% confidence level. 19 The value of σ only matters for the computation of the iceberg trade cost barriers. The other costs do not depend on it. We show the results of assuming alternative values of σ in Appendix H. 20 We have also experimented with other cutoffs and the results are similar. Problems appear when the cutoff becomes too small in the sense that the slope for the UK becomes less than 1. We should mention that when the cutoff becomes too large, the slopes tend to become more similar. A problem with cutoffs that are too large is that very few firms remain in the sample. 21 Note that this is a general equilibrium effect. As pointed out in Proposition 1, the partial equilibrium effect is that a larger trade cost (fixed or variable) reduces the growth rate. 22 Notice that we do not compare sunk export costs, since quantitatively they have negligible effects on equilibrium outcomes such as productivities. 23 http://www.worldportsource.com. 24 We only show the costs relative to Germany. 25 Recall that̃is a hypothetical rate at which a firm would grow if it would expect never to export. 26 Through trade balance, if a countrys exports are low, its imports must also be low. 27 An alternative would be to target the slope of exporters and non-exporters separately. This introduces new targets, as well as additional parameters. As a result, the comparison with the benchmark case would be less transparent, and it would not be clear whether the differences are due to the existence of never exporters or to the different moments targeted. 28 The smooth pasting condition is not necessary because ẑis exogenous.
